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Abstract—In this paper, we explore the physical-layer security
of a multi-user wireless system that consists of multiple users
intending to transmit to a base station (BS), while multiple
eavesdroppers attempt to tap the user transmissions. We examine
the employment of multi-user scheduling for improving the
transmission security against eavesdropping and propose a multi-
user scheduling scheme, which only requires the channel state
information (CSI) of BS without the need of the passive eaves-
droppers’ CSI. We also consider the round-robin scheduling for
comparison purposes. The closed-form secrecy outage probability
expressions of the round-robin scheduling and proposed multi-
user scheduling are derived over Rayleigh fading channels.
Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed multi-user
scheduling outperforms the round-robin scheduling in terms of
the secrecy outage probability. As the number of users increases,
the secrecy outage probability of round-robin scheduling keeps
unchanged. By contrast, the secrecy outage performance of the
proposed multi-user scheduling improves significantly with an
increasing number of users.
Index Terms—Secrecy outage probability, multi-user schedul-
ing, round-robin scheduling, Rayleigh fading.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, wireless security has attracted significant attention
from the research community [1], [2]. The broadcast nature of
radio propagation makes the wireless transmission accessible
to unauthorized users and extremely vulnerable to the eaves-
dropping attack. Traditionally, cryptographic techniques rely-
ing on secret keys are employed to guarantee the transmission
confidentiality. However, an eavesdropper with unlimited com-
puting power can still crack the conventional cryptographic
approaches by launching the exhaustive key search (known
as brute-force attack). To this end, physical-layer security
(PLS) is now emerging as a promising paradigm to protect the
communication confidentiality against the brute-force attack
by exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless channels
[3].
PLS work can be traced back to 1970s and was studied
by Wyner in [4], where a classical wiretap channel model
comprised of one source and one destination in the presence
of an eavesdropper was analyzed and characterized from an
information-theoretic perspective in terms of the achievable
secrecy rate performance. In [5], the authors introduced the
notion of secrecy capacity, which is shown as the difference
between the channel capacity of the main link (from source
to destination) and the wiretap link (from source to eaves-
dropper). However, in wireless networks, the multipath fading
of radio propagation results in a performance degradation of
the wireless secrecy capacity. As a remedy, the multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) [6], [7] and cooperative relaying
techniques [8], [9] were studied extensively to improve the
wireless secrecy capacity against the fading effect.
The artificial noise aided security approaches [10]-[12] were
examined by generating a specifically-designed interfering
signal (referred to as artificial noise) that will adversely affect
the wiretap channel only without causing any negative impact
on the legitimate main channel. In [10], the authors proposed
a quality of service (QoS) based artificial noise generation
scheme for the sake of minimizing the signal-to-interference-
and-noise ratio received at an eavesdropper while meeting
a required signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) re-
ceived at the desired destination. In [11], the multiple antennas
assisted artificial noise generation was studied and the closed-
form secrecy rate expressions were derived in high signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) regime under the target data throughput
requirement. Additionally, a joint artificial noise and beam-
forming design was studied in [12] for enhancing the physical-
layer security in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
It is worth mentioning that the security advantage of artifi-
cial noise methods studied in [10]-[12] comes at the expense of
additional power resources which are consumed for generating
the artificial noise to confuse the eavesdropper. By contrast,
this paper examines the multi-user scheduling for improving
the wireless physical-layer security without consuming any
additional power resources. The main contributions of this
paper can be summarized as follows. First, we propose a multi-
user scheduling scheme without the channel state information
(CSI) of eavesdroppers in a wireless network consisting of one
base station (BS) and multiple users. The conventional round-
robin scheduling is also considered as a benchmark. Second,
we derive exact closed-form expressions of the secrecy outage
probability for both the conventional round-robin scheduling
and the proposed multi-user scheduling schemes over Rayleigh
fading channels. Finally, numerical evaluations are carried out
to show the security advantage of the proposed multi-user
scheduling over the round-robin scheduling in terms of the
secrecy outage probability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the system model of a wireless
network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Then, we
present the conventional round-robin scheduling as well as the
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Fig. 1. A multi-user multi-eavesdropper (MUME) wireless network.
proposed multi-user scheduling schemes in Section III, where
the closed-form secrecy outage expressions of two scheduling
schemes are derived over Rayleigh fading channels. Next, in
Section IV, the numerical performance evaluation is conducted
in terms of the secrecy outage probability. Finally, we provide
some concluding remarks in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a multi-user multi-
eavesdropper wireless network consisting of one base station
(BS) and M users in the presence of N eavesdroppers. In
Fig. 1, M users are intended to transmit their data to the BS,
while there are N eavesdroppers attempting to tap the data
transmitted from the users. For notational convenience, the
set of M users and that of N eavesdroppers are denoted by
U = {Ui|i = 1, 2, · · · ,M} and E = {Ej |j = 1, 2, · · · , N},
respectively. Without any loss of generality, we consider that
Ui transmits its signal xi to BS with power Pi, thus the signal
received at BS can be expressed as
yb =
√
Pihibxi + nb, (1)
where hib represents the wireless fading of the channel from
Ui to BS and nb represents the zero-mean additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with the variance of N0 experienced
at BS. From (1), we can obtain the channel capacity from Ui
to BS as
Cib = log2(1 +
|hib|
2Pi
N0
). (2)
Meanwhile, due to the openness nature of wireless propaga-
tion, the signal xi transmitted from Ui may also be overheard
by the eavesdroppers. Hence, the received signal at an eaves-
dropper Ej is expressed as
yej =
√
Pihiejxi + nej , (3)
where hiej represents the wireless fading of the channel from
Ui to Ej and nej represents the zero-mean AWGN with the
variance of N0 experienced at the eavesdropper Ej . Using (3),
we obtain the channel capacity from Ui to Ej as
Ciej = log2(1 +
|hiej |
2Pi
N0
). (4)
In this paper, the eavesdroppers of Fig. 1 are assumed to be
uncoordinated in tapping the Ui-BS transmission. This implies
that if any of the N eavesdroppers succeeds in decoding the
signal xi, the Ui-BS transmission becomes insecure. Thus, the
overall wiretap channel capacity is given by the maximum of
individual channel capacities achieved at the N eavesdroppers,
yielding
Cie = max
ej∈E
Ciej = max
ej∈E
log2(1 +
|hiej |
2Pi
N0
), (5)
where E denotes the set of N eavesdroppers. As is shown in
[5], the secrecy capacity is given by the difference between
the capacity of the main channel and the wiretap channel.
Therefore, the secrecy capacity of the Ui-BS transmission in
the presence of N uncoordinated eavesdroppers is given by
Csecrecyi = Cib − Cie = Cib −max
ej∈E
Ciej , (6)
where Cib and Ciej are given by (2) and (4), respectively.
It is pointed out that all the wireless channels of Fig. 1 are
characterized using the Rayleigh fading model. Moreover, the
average channel gains of |hib|2 and |hiej |2 are represented by
σ2ib and σ2iej , respectively.
III. MULTI-USER SCHEDULING SCHEMES AND SECRECY
OUTAGE ANALYSIS
In this section, we propose a multi-user scheduling schemes
under the assumption that only the CSIs of the main channels
from M users to BS are available without knowing the
eavesdroppers’ CSIs. We also consider the conventional round-
robin scheduling as a benchmark scheme. The closed-form
secrecy outage expressions of the round-robin scheduling and
the proposed multi-user scheduling are then analyzed over
Rayleigh fading channels.
A. Round-Robin Scheduling
Let us first consider the round-robin scheduling as a base-
line. To be specific, the round-robin scheduling allows M users
to take turns in transmitting their signals to BS. As is known,
when the secrecy capacity falls below a predefined secrecy
rate Rs, the so-called secrecy outage event is considered to
occur in this case. Given that Ui transmits its signal to BS,
the secrecy outage probability of the Ui-BS transmission in
the presence of N uncoordinated eavesdroppers is expressed
as
Pout,i = Pr
(
Csecrecyi < Rs
)
, (7)
where Csecrecyi is given by (6). Substituting Csecrecyi from (6)
into (7) yields
Pout,i = Pr
(
max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2 >
|hib|
2
2Rs
−
(2Rs − 1)N0
2RsPi
)
, (8)
which is further obtained as (see Appendix A)
Pout,i = 1−
2N−1∑
n=0
(−1)|En|
1 +
∑
ej∈En
σ2
ib
2Rsσ2
iej
exp(−
θ
σ2ib
), (9)
where θ = (2
Rs−1)N0
Pi
, N is the number of eavesdroppers, En
represents the n-th non-empty subcollection of the elements
of E , and |En| is the cardinality of set En. In the round-robin
scheduling scheme, M users to take turns in transmitting to
BS and thus the secrecy outage probability of the conventional
round-robin scheduling scheme is given by the mean of M
users’ secrecy outage probabilities, i.e.,
P roundout =
1
M
M∑
i=1
Pout,i, (10)
where M is the number of users and Pout,i is given by (9).
B. Proposed Multi-user Scheduling
This subsection presents a multi-user scheduling scheme
under the assumption that only the CSIs of M users are avail-
able without knowing the N eavesdroppers’ CSI knowledge.
In practice, it is challenging to obtain the eavesdroppers’ CSIs,
since the eavesdroppers are typically passive. This motivates
us to consider the scenario without the eavesdroppers’ CSIs.
Considering that only the CSIs of users-to-BS channels are
known, a user with the highest instantaneous channel gain is
selected to transmit to BS, thus the scheduled user is obtained
as
Scheduled User = argmax
i∈U
|hib|
2, (11)
where U represents the set of M users. It can be seen from
(11) that only |hib|2 is assumed in performing the multi-user
scheduling without the need of the passive eavesdroppers’
CSIs |hiej |2. This is attractive from a practical perspective,
since the passive eavesdroppers’ CSIs are challenging to obtain
in practice. For notational convenience, let ‘s’ denote the
scheduled user by (11). Hence, in the presence of N uncoordi-
nated eavesdroppers, the secrecy capacity of the transmission
from the scheduled user (s) to BS is given by
Csecrecys = Csb −max
ej∈E
Csej , (12)
where Csb and Csej represent the channel capacity from the
scheduled user to BS and to eavesdropper Ej , respectively,
which are given by
Csb = log2(1 +
|hsb|
2Pi
N0
), (13)
and
Csej = log2(1 +
|hsej |
2Pi
N0
), (14)
where |hsb|2 and |hsej |2 represent the fading coefficients of the
channels from the scheduled user to BS and to eavesdropper
Ej , respectively. Combining (11)-(14), we can obtain the se-
crecy outage probability of the proposed multi-user scheduling
as
P proposedout = Pr (C
secrecy
s < Rs)
= Pr
(
max
ej∈E
|hsej |
2 >
|hsb|
2 − θ
2Rs
)
,
(15)
where θ = (2
Rs−1)N0
Pi
. Using the law of total probability, we
can rewrite (15) as
P proposedout =
M∑
i=1
Pr
(
max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2 >
|hib|
2 − θ
2Rs
, s = i
)
. (16)
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus MER λme of the round-robin
scheduling and the proposed multi-user scheduling schemes for different
number of eavesdroppers N with M = 4, Rs = 0.5 bit/s/Hz, and
γ = 10 dB.
Combining (11) and (16), we obtain the secrecy outage prob-
ability of the proposed multi-user scheduling as
P proposedout =
M∑
i=1
Pr


max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2 >
|hib|
2 − θ
2Rs
,
max
k∈U
k 6=i
|hkb|
2 < |hib|
2

. (17)
Proceeding as in Appendix B, we obtain (18) at the top of
the following page, where U0 represents an empty set, Um
represents the m-th non-empty subset of U −{Ui}, and‘−’ is
the set difference.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical secrecy outage prob-
ability results of the conventional round-robin scheduling and
the proposed multi-user scheduling schemes. For notational
convenience, λme is used to represent the ratio of σ2ib to
σ2iej , which is called the main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER)
throughout this paper. Moreover, let γ denote the ratio of Pi
to N0, i.e., γ = Pi/N0. Fig. 2 plots (10) and (18) as a function
of the MER λme for different number of eavesdroppers
N . The simulated secrecy outage probability results for the
conventional round-robin scheduling and the proposed multi-
user scheduling schemes are also given in this figure. One
can see from Fig. 2 that as the number of eavesdroppers
increases from N = 2 to 8, the secrecy outage probabilities
of the round-robin scheduling and the proposed multi-user
scheduling schemes both increase. This means that with an
increasing number of eavesdroppers, it would be more likely
to succeed in intercepting the wireless transmission. It is also
shown from Fig. 2 that for both the cases of N = 2 and
N = 8, the proposed multi-user scheduling outperforms the
conventional round-robin scheduling in terms of the secrecy
outage probability. Additionally, the theoretical secrecy outage
probabilities match the simulated results well.
Fig. 3 illustrates the secrecy outage probability versus MER
λme of the round-robin scheduling and the proposed multi-
P
proposed
out =
M∑
i=1
2M−1−1∑
m=0
(−1)|Um|
1 +
∑
k∈Um
σ2
ib
σ2
kb
(
1− exp(−
∑
k∈Um
θ
σ2kb
−
θ
σ2ib
)
)
+
M∑
i=1
2M−1−1∑
m=0
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|Um|+|En|+1
1 +
∑
ej∈En
σ2
ib
2Rsσ2
iej
+
∑
k∈Um
σ2
ib
σ2
kb
exp(−
∑
k∈Um
θ
σ2kb
−
θ
σ2ib
)
(18)
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus MER λme of the round-robin
scheduling and the proposed multi-user scheduling schemes for different
number of users M with N = 4, Rs = 0.5 bit/s/Hz, and γ = 10 dB.
user scheduling schemes for different number of users M
with N = 4, Rs = 0.5 bit/s/Hz, and γ = 10 dB. As shown
in Fig. 3, as the number of users increases from M = 4 to
8, the secrecy outage probability of the conventional round-
robin scheduling remains unchanged. By contrast, the secrecy
outage performance of the proposed multi-user scheduling
scheme corresponding to M = 8 is significantly better than
that corresponding to M = 4. This further confirms the
security advantage of the proposed multi-user scheduling over
the conventional round-robin scheduling.
In Fig. 4, we show the secrecy outage probability versus
the number of users M of the round-robin scheduling and the
proposed multi-user scheduling schemes for different secrecy
rates with N = 4 and λme = γ = 10 dB. It is observed from
Fig. 4 that the secrecy outage probability of the conventional
round-robin scheduling is insusceptible to the number of
users. By contrast, the secrecy performance of the proposed
multi-user scheduling scheme is improved as the number of
users increases. Fig. 4 also shows that for both the cases of
Rs = 2 bit/s/Hz and Rs = 1 bit/s/Hz, the proposed multi-
user scheduling performs better than the conventional round-
robin scheduling in terms of the secrecy outage probability,
especially with a large number of users.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the secrecy outage performance
of a multi-user multi-eavesdropper wireless system, where
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multiple users are intended to transmit to BS in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers attempting to tap the users-to-BS trans-
missions. We proposed a multi-user scheduling scheme that
only needs the CSIs of the users-to-BS channels without know-
ing the passive eavesdroppers’ CSIs. We also considered the
conventional round-robin scheduling as a benchmark. Closed-
form secrecy outage probability expressions of the round-robin
scheduling and the proposed multi-user scheduling were de-
rived over Rayleigh fading channels. Numerical performance
comparisons between the conventional round-robin scheduling
and the proposed multi-user scheduling schemes were carried
out in terms of the secrecy outage probability. It was showed
that the secrecy outage performance of the proposed multi-
user scheduling is significantly better than that of the conven-
tional round-robin scheduling. Additionally, upon increasing
the number of users, the secrecy outage probability of the
proposed multi-user scheduling scheme decreases, showing
the security advantage of exploiting the multi-user scheduling
against eavesdropping attacks.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF (9)
For notational convenience, let X and Yj denote |hib|2
and |hiej |2, respectively. Noting that |hib|2 and |hiej |2 are
independent and exponentially distributed random variables
with respective means of σ2ib and σ2iej , we can rewrite (8)
as
Pout,i = Pr
(
max
ej∈E
Yj >
X
2Rs
−
θ
2Rs
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
θ
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
x− θ
2Rsσ2iej
)
)
×
1
σ2ib
exp(−
x
σ2ib
)dx,
(A.1)
where θ = (2
Rs−1)N0
Pi
. By using the binomial theorem, the
term
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(− x−θ
2Rsσ2
iej
)
)
can be expanded as
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
x− θ
2Rsσ2iej
)
)
=
2N−1∑
n=0
(−1)|En| exp(−
∑
ej∈En
x− θ
2Rsσ2iej
),
(A.2)
where
∑
ej∈E0
1
2Rsσ2
iej
= 0, E0 is an empty set, En represents
the n-th non-empty subset of E , and |En| is the cardinality of
En. Substituting (A.2) into (A.1) yields
Pout,i = 1−
2N−1∑
n=0
∫ ∞
θ
(−1)|En|
σ2ib
exp(−
x
σ2ib
−
∑
ej∈En
x− θ
2Rsσ2iej
)dx
= 1−
2N−1∑
n=0
(−1)|En|
1 +
∑
ej∈En
σ2
ib
2Rsσ2
iej
exp(−
θ
σ2ib
),
(A.3)
which is (9).
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF (18)
Denoting |hib|2 = X , |hiej |2 = Yj , and |hkb|2 = Zk, we
can rewrite (17) as
P proposedout =
M∑
i=1
Pr

max
ej∈E
Yj >
X − θ
2Rs
,max
k∈U
k 6=i
Zk < X

.
(B.1)
Noting that random variables |hib|2, |hiej |2 and |hkb|2 are in-
dependent and exponentially distributed with respective means
of σ2ib, σ2iej and σ
2
kb, we obtain
P
proposed
out =
M∑
i=1
∫ θ
0
M∏
k=1
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
1
σ2ib
exp(−
x
σ2ib
)dx
+
M∑
i=1
∫ ∞
θ

1− N∏
j=1
(
1− exp(−
x− θ
2Rsσ2iej
)
)

×
M∏
k=1
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
1
σ2ib
exp(−
x
σ2ib
)dx.
(B.2)
Using the binomial theorem, we have
M∏
k=1
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
=
2M−1−1∑
m=0
(−1)|Um| exp(−
∑
k∈Um
x
σ2kb
),
(B.3)
where
∑
k∈U0
1
σ2
kb
= 0, U0 represents an empty set, Um repre-
sents the m-th non-empty subset of U − {Ui}, and ‘−’ is the
set difference. Similarly, term
N∏
j=1
(
1− exp(− x−θ
2Rsσ2
iej
)
)
can
be expanded as
N∏
j=1
(
1− exp(−
x− θ
2Rsσ2iej
)
)
= 1 +
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En| exp(−
∑
ej∈En
x− θ
2Rsσ2iej
),
(B.4)
where En represents the n-th non-empty subset of E . Substitut-
ing (B.3) and (B.4) into (B.2) and performing the integration,
we can arrive at (18).
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